



Religious Freedom as a Technology of Modern 
Secular Governance 
 




Two marks of a mature field of inquiry are that its central 
problems are well-formulated and that its conventional wisdom is 
sound. Even in the most mature fields, however, the conventional 
wisdom can sometimes be misleading and the central problems 
poorly cast …. Progress can be made only if much of the 




The conventional wisdom in religious freedom discourse rests 
on two core tenets: first, that sovereign authority must be secular in 
order to ensure neutrality towards religion and thus the separation of 
religion and state that is foundational to liberal democracy (the 
neutrality thesis); and second, that in order to ensure neutrality towards 
both religion and non-religion, political and legal authority must 
guarantee the universal (human) right to freedom of religion, 
conscience and belief so that individuals and communities may 
practice their faith freely without coercion or interference (the 
universality thesis).   
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The thesis of this chapter is that these two tenets of the 
conventional wisdom must be discarded if we are to gain a better grasp 
of the salience and structure of the contemporary politics of religious 
freedom.  Recent scholarship on secularism has made clear that the 
neutrality thesis is no longer tenable.  Rather than withdraw from the 
religious domain, the modern secular state has been shown constantly 
to intervene and seek to reconfigure substantive features of religious 
life by distinguishing between what is properly religious in order to 
render certain practices indifferent to religious doctrine and thus bring 
them legitimately under the domain of civil law.  The result has been 
the constant intertwining of religion and governance as modern secular 
power operates incessantly to determine the scope of religion in the 
political order.   
The universality thesis has been shown to be similarly 
untenable.  In fields as disparate as legal anthropology and intellectual 
history, the idea that a universal right to religious freedom exists that is 
neutral towards religion or protects all religions equally is today 
broadly criticized.  Rather, it is more accurate to say that the human 
right to religious freedom purports to treat all rights-holders equally.  
In this move, however, a seismic shift occurs in the relationship 
between notions of normativity and authority.   
It is now the rational, autonomous human being, as opposed to 
heteronomous “religion,” that is the proper subject of normativity.  
The individual, now as a matter of right, decides for herself (as 
authority) questions of religion, conscience and belief (as object).  
Religion is hereby reformulated in accordance with a distinctive 
normative model of religiosity: as privatized belief in a set of creedal 
propositions to which an autonomous individual gives assent.  This 
generates the distinctive and unstable co-imbrication of conscience and 
autonomy as the “buffered” self simultaneously chooses autonomously 
and believes freely.2  
The genius and enduring appeal of modern discourse rests on the 
fact each thesis is defined in terms of the other.  On the one hand, the 
neutrality of the political order is said to be secured by the guarantee to 
protect the universal right to religious liberty.  In this move, the 
 
2. See Peter Danchin, Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of 
Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 663, 708 ff. (2011). 
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disciplinary structure and secular practices of the public sphere 
combine to produce the believing subject and concomitant post-
Protestant conceptions of religion (especially in relation to scripture 
and rituals) and religious subjectivity (especially as regards moral and 
ethical sensibilities).  On the other hand, the universality of the right is 
said to be secured by the neutrality of the public sphere towards 
religion.  This requires the state constantly either to recognize or limit 
claims regarding the manifestation of religious belief and practice 
generating the distinctive entanglement of religion and law in different 
domains of the public and private spheres. 
This double-structure necessarily generates two interrelated 
paradoxes.  First, by defining the secular neutrality of the public 
sphere in terms of the universal right to religious freedom, the 
authority of religion is privatized relative to state authority and its 
normativity interiorized relative to individual subjectivity.  Second and 
as a result, religious freedom is secured through subordination of 
religion to the secular power and public reason of the sovereign state.  
By defining the meaning and scope of freedom protected by the right 
in terms of secular neutrality, the claims of individuals and 
communities to religious liberty are in fact limited through a 
continuing praxis of legal recognition and regulation.   
The chapter argues that this oscillating dialectic between 
secular neutrality and individual right defines how the right to 
religious freedom functions as a technology of secular governance and 
is integral to the power of the modern nation-state.  This can be seen in 
three key areas.  First, in the foundational distinction common to all 
contemporary formulations of the right between a forum internum on 
the one hand, defined as the locus of religious belief and conscience 
ostensibly protected absolutely by law, and a forum externum on the 
other, where the outward expression or manifestation of this belief is 
subject to state regulation.  Second, in debates concerning the proper 
subject of the right and whether this can include collective subjects 
and actually-existing systems of religious law adhered to by both 
majority and minority religions.  And third, in cases where conflicts of 
value arise between two or more claims internal to the right to 
religious liberty itself, i.e. where both sides to a dispute frame their 
arguments as a claim to religious freedom.   
The argument proceeds in two parts.  Part II outlines the two 
dominant genealogies that underlie the modern structure of the right to 
religious liberty and its twin theses of neutrality and universality.  Part 
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III then illustrates the three themes discussed above by considering the 
recent decision of the U.K. Supreme Court in R (on the application of 
E) v. The Governing Body of JFS (the “JFS” or “Jews’ Free School” 
case).3  Finally, Part IV concludes by noting how, counterintuitively, 
the three issues concerning the conceptual structure, subject and 
authority of the right cut across the Western and non-Western divide.  
Once the antinomies generated by these paradoxes are made visible, it 
thus becomes clear that the right to religious freedom is not a single, 
stable principle existing outside culture, spatial geographies or power, 
but instead is a contested, polyvalent concept existing and unfolding 
within historical political orders.   
II. RIVAL GENEALOGIES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
There is a  common origin story told about religious liberty in 
European history, namely, that “it helped establish the basis of 
political secularism by separating religion from politics and making 
the state indifferent [or in today’s language “neutral”] to claims of 
religious truth.”4  On this view, “since its initial formulation in 
seventeenth-century political thought, religious liberty has continued 
progressively to expand its tolerant ambit to all religions far beyond its 
initial mandate to institute peace across Christian denominations.”5   
In recent scholarship, however, this narrative has been 
critically revisited to show how religious liberty in its earliest 
formulation in European history was in reality “an unsteady and 
unstable concept, the result of a “‘circumstantial casuistry’ of 
historically embedded political concepts” rather than a principled 
commitment to the separation of church and state.”6  Ian Hunter has 
argued that the “rival and incompatible conceptions of religious 
freedom that emerged in early modern Germany — both among the 
Christian confessions and then among them and the institutions of 
public law and politics — have proved inscrutable to both normative 
 
3. [2009] UKSC 15, [2010] 2 A.C. 728 (S.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.) 
[hereinafter JFS].  
4. Saba Mahmood and Peter Danchin, Politics of Religious Freedom: 
Contested Genealogies, 113 SOUTH ATL. Q. 1, 2 (2014). 
5. Id. 
6. Id.  
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philosophical ordering and to sociohistorical reconciliation.”7  On the 
basis of their regional and contingent nature,   
the various philosophical attempts to ground religious 
liberty in transcendent principles — whether in Catholic and 
Protestant scholasticisms, Lockean and Kantian 
rationalisms, or Taylorean philosophical hermeneutics — 
have been unable to supersede the incompatibilities at the 
heart of these conceptions since their early history.8 
The result is that the rights forms we see today embedded in 
constitutional and international human rights instruments derive from 
heterogeneous traditions and specific political projects.  Accordingly, 
divergent genealogies coexist within the capacious language of 
religious freedom, always submerging or re-emerging in new ways to 
refract the political conflicts of the day.   
Following Hunter’s work on civil and metaphysical philosophy 
in early modern Germany,9 we can identify two main rival traditions 
internal to liberal thought which remain deeply entangled in the 
normative structure and jurisprudence of the right to religious liberty 
as formulated in provisions such as Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
A. Civil Philosophy and Secular Neutrality 
In the first, older liberal tradition the public sphere was 
understood in terms of social peace and religious liberty conceived in 
jurisdictional terms.10  This early conception, which predated the 
philosophical or “metaphysical” Aufklärung of Kant by more than a 
century, derived from a civil philosophy that sought to desacralize the 
state and led over time to both the churches losing their civil and 
political authority and to the gradual spiritualization of religion.11   
 
7. Ian Hunter, Religious Freedom in Early Modern Germany: Theology, 
Philosophy, and Legal Casuistry, 113 SOUTH ATL. Q. 37, 39 (2014).  
8. Mahmood and Danchin, supra note 4, at 2.  
9. IAN HUNTER, RIVAL ENLIGHTENMENTS: CIVIL AND METAPHYSICAL 
PHILOSOPHY IN EARLY MODERN GERMANY (2001). 
10. Although this “civil” jurisdictional conception differed markedly from the 
older “Two Realms” or “Two Kingdoms” tradition of church-state separation under 
which all authority was viewed as ultimately derived from God and only question 
was to demarcate what was properly God’s and what was Caesar’s. 
11. Danchin, supra note 2, at 731.  
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The goal of this double-strategy was not to protect religious 
freedom as a natural right against the State but to end religious civil 
war by establishing a “neutral” juristic mode of governance over a 
multi-confessional society as the means of maintaining a legally 
enforced toleration between the rival religious communities.  Central 
to this strategy was the notion of adiaphora: the old Stoic idea of 
actions that morality neither mandates nor forbids which within 
Christianity was understood to refer to matters regarded as inessential 
to faith but nevertheless permissible for Christians or allowed in the 
Church.   
On this basis, the civil philosopher Christian Thomasius 
declared “virtually the entirety of the visible church — all of its 
liturgies, sacraments and theological doctrines — to be morally 
indifferent with regards to salvation” while at the same time holding 
that “forms of worship were a matter of ‘Christian freedom’ to be left 
to the disposition of individuals or groups to the extent they posed no 
threat to social peace.”12  The result was that “should any form of 
worship pose a threat to public peace then, as something morally 
indifferent, it was legitimately subject to the civil sovereign, who had 
absolute authority over all matters capable of threatening public 
order.”13 
In Thomasius’s late seventeenth century civil philosophy we 
already see the core features of modern secular power: the Statist 
drawing of a line between the religious and the secular through 
simultaneous demarcation of the essentially-religious (held to be 
absolutely free from sovereign interference) from the religiously-
permissible (external manifestations of religiosity held to be publicly 
recognized but subject to limitation by the State on grounds of public 
peace and order).14  
 
12. Ian Hunter, Religious Offences and Liberal Politics: From the Religious 
Settlements to Multi-cultural Society, at 9.   
13. Ibid.  This employed a “juridical-ecclesial category to narrow the array of 
doctrine and liturgy where salvation was at stake and to expand the array that could 
be regarded as soteriologically indifferent and hence to be seen not from a 
sacramental-religious standpoint but from a juridical-political one.”  Hunter, supra 
note 7, at 56. 
14. Again, it is important to observe that this strategy was not rights-based.  
Modern accounts of neutrality as an objective principle in modern constitutionalism 
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How this occurred in practice, however, was infinitely varied, 
contested, and ultimately settled by local and contingent forms of  
negotiation and resolved, if at all, by legal casuistry and the coercive 
imposition of judgments within regional jurisdictions and national 
state-religion settlements.  For this reason, the intellectual origins and 
meaning of the idea of political neutrality in religious freedom 
discourse is to be found not in philosophical foundations but in the 
horizon of “the religious, political, and juridical casuistries spawned 
by the national religious settlements themselves.”15  As we shall see in 
Part III below, this remains an important insight for understanding the 
contemporary politics of religious freedom.   
Before proceeding, it is helpful to observe how this double-
strategy of spiritualizing religion and desacralizing the state stands in 
relation to the better-known argument for religious toleration also 
advanced by John Locke in the late seventeenth century.  For Locke, 
toleration was a right of individuals against an intolerant state whereas 
for Thomasius and the civil philosophers it was a right of the state 
against intolerant religious communities.16  
The juridical construction of religious freedom in German 
public law thus sought to establish political neutrality toward ultimate 
theological principles as “the condition of establishing parity of legal 
treatment for rival religions as equally valid legal associations.”  This 
marked a shift in the understanding of religious authority as Erastian 
control of churches by the State was effected to deny the coercive 
authority of religious institutions in enforcing the demands of 
conscience.  This was the condition of freedom in the private sphere – 
a sphere defined, protected, delimited and increasingly regulated by 
the State itself. 
 
thus refer to it as creating a kind of “subjectless right.”  Christoph Möllers, Limits of 
Differentiation: On the Role of Religion in Democratic Constitutionalism, 
unpublished paper, presented at LAPA workshop, October 2014.  
15. Hunter, supra note 7, at 40.  The notion of negotiated and contingent 
relations between the state and actually-existing religious communities, groups and 
traditions is quite distinct from the notion of “a right” which implies a legal/moral 
relation between the state and an individual subject as rights-holder as well as a 
background justification not only of the right itself but its distinctive function of 
holding others to correlative duties. 
16. Ibid. 52.  Thus “Pufendorf’s and Thomasius’s conceptions were the 
instruments and effect of German imperial public law and the Brandenburg-Prussian 
settlement, whereas Locke’s was an instrument of political-theological dissent from 
the Anglican settlement.” Id. 
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Similarly, Locke’s empiricist epistemology led to a conception 
of civil power as directed to the regulation of things that can be 
“objectively known,” whereas religious belief was relegated to the 
status of “subjective conviction.”17  On this view, the neutrality of civil 
law with respect to religion and the truth of particular religious 
practices was guaranteed epistemologically by relegating religious 
belief to the “realm of speculation.”18  
B. Moral Philosophy and Universal Right 
The idea of religion as a “subjective belief” which is unable to 
be coerced because located in a private mental space marks the 
beginning of a new religious psychology and corresponding shift from 
the privatization of religious authority in the early modern period to its 
normative interiorization in modernity.  As Talal Asad has suggested, 
it is the idea that the mind is the impregnable bastion of true religious 
experience that provides the modern view with its plausibility, i.e. that 
coercion of religious belief is irrational because impossible.   
Given that force can only secure an insincere profession of 
faith and outward conformity, true authenticity rests on the modern 
subject’s ability to choose her beliefs and act on them.  This 
conception of belief as “singular and inaccessible to other locations” 
reinforces the idea of an autonomous “buffered” subject able to 
separate itself from objects by contemplation, reasoning and 
interpretation and choose from available beliefs.  
This intellectual disposition and sensibility prefigures the 
second, later liberal tradition whereby the public sphere is reconceived 
 
17. Locke’s theory of toleration thus equally relies on a particular conception of 
adiaphora: religious matters, properly understood, have no civil bearing as properly 
religious practices concern only a care for salvation and cannot harm the life, liberty 
or estate of civil subjects.  Conversely, there can be no coercion in “religious 
matters” as one cannot correct belief which is a matter of private concern.  Kirstie 
McClure, Difference, Diversity, and the Limits of Toleration, 18 POLITICAL THEORY 
361, 377 (1990).  
18. It is the “discursive separation from other-worldly concerns” that therefore 
underpins the capacity of civil discourse to convert incommensurable expressions of 
religious “difference” into a politically indifferent “diversity” of religious practices.  
McClure, supra note 17, at 385.  On this account, religion as a matter of facticity 
loses its epistemological privilege joining other mundane objects subject to civil 
regulation.  
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in terms of a moral theory of justice and religious liberty grounded in a 
complex (and unstable) notion of a right to freedom of conscience and 
belief.  This conception derived from a metaphysical (or more 
accurately “transcendental”) philosophical tradition that 
simultaneously sacralized reason and rationalized religion in a morally 
grounded State.  
This Kantian scheme generated a new secular morality and 
theory of liberal political order premised on broadly Protestant 
conceptions of the individual, freedom and religion.  Unlike the civil 
philosophy of the early modern period, the subject of this moral 
philosophy was not religion per se, but the individual as both the 
subject and bearer of rights.  The category of religion was rationalized 
and naturalized into a generically Protestant notion of conscience or 
belief understood as internal to human subjectivity while the notion of 
autonomy was asserted as the universal basis for political authority.19   
While Kant himself maintained the distinction between public 
and private spheres – reason for him being “submissive” in the private 
sphere on account of the moral duty to follow one’s conscience while 
“free” in the public sphere by virtue of the right to “use reason 
publicly in all matters”20 – over the last two centuries these 
distinctions have substantially been reversed in the modern secular 
imaginary.21   
This has had a profound effect on conceptualization of the 
public and private spheres.  If for the civil philosophers and Kant alike 
a spiritualized notion of religion as faith or conscience characterized 
the private sphere, today the duty to follow conscience has been re-
imagined as freedom of conscience now understood in terms of 
autonomy as an individual right to do what one believes is right.22  The 
 
19. Danchin, supra note 2, at 733-4. 
20. Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?, in 
WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT? EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ANSWERS AND TWENTIETH-
CENTURY QUESTIONS 58, 59–60 (James Schmidt ed., 1996). 
21. As Foucault observed, Kant’s conception of public and private is “term for 
term, the opposite of what is ordinarily called freedom of conscience.” Michel 
Foucault, What Is Enlightenment?, in THE FOUCAULT READER 32, 36 (Paul Rabinow 
ed., 1984). 
22. Thus, in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant develops the 
notion of a purely “rational religion,” which is premised on the exclusion of theology 
from theoretical reason and the grounding of faith in solely practical (moral) reason. 
In this way, religion is to be controlled by and be subject to the demands of (secular) 
morality.  Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, in 
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private sphere remains a space of freedom from State interference, but 
the basis for this restraint is not respect for religion or conscience per 
se, but rather for the individual’s right to choose not only the dictates 
of her religion or conscience but any belief at all.  This is reflected in 
the contemporary formulation of the forum internum as “freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion” and comprises the modern category 
of the essentially-religious, i.e. as not subject to limitation by the State. 
In this way, Kant’s Copernican philosophical revolution had 
two main features: first, contrary to older traditions of Catholic natural 
law theory, it was non-naturalist: the ground of moral obligation was 
to be sought not in nature, human nature, external (clerical or 
traditional) authority, or any contingent circumstances of the moral 
agent; and second, contrary to Protestant theologies of God as the 
moral law-giver, it posited a new authoritative source of moral 
obligation now to be found a priori in transcendental concepts internal 
to pure reason alone. 
Moral judgment was thus to be given autonomously by the 
agent to herself — imposed upon the world — under the rational 
discipline of the categorical imperative.  The first move defined 
enlightenment in terms of a particular conception of rationality — the 
right to “think for oneself” and be free of heteronomous (especially 
religious) sources of moral obligation, while the second defined 
freedom as acceptance of what reason dictates as duty (one should 
always act in accordance with what one can simultaneously will as 
universal law). 
The difficulty is that each of these moves involves fraught and 
contested claims not only about the phenomenal world, but about an 
imagined noumenal or transcendental realm internal to a particular 
(Protestant) conception of rationality.23  This new moral economy 
marked the reversal in ethical thought in modernity as what was 
 
RELIGION WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS 31 
(Allen Wood & George di Giovanni eds., trans., 1998). 
23. As Foucault observed regarding Kant’s 1784 essay An Answer to the 
Question: What is Enlightenment?, the enlightenment as posited by Kant was the 
discovery of an exit, a “way out,” a “process that releases us from the status of 
‘immaturity’ ” (a state where religious authority takes the place of our conscience) by 
a “modification of the preexisting relation linking will, authority, and the use of 
reason.” 
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previously external and objective (the authority of God) now became 
internal and subjective (the unstable co-imbrication of autonomy and 
conscience in the double bind of “freely chosen conscience or belief,”) 
while what was previously internal and subject to God’s natural order 
(human reason) now itself became external and objective (universal 
reason in the disciplinary form of the categorical imperative).  These 
reversals had the remarkable effect of simultaneously rationalizing 
religion and sacralizing reason – or what Kant himself in 1793 termed 
“Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.” 
 
In this sequence of moves, the concept of religion and its 
authority in political order were fundamentally altered.  We can see 
this along three broad dimensions.  First, it was now irrational (as 
defined by rationality itself) for religion to be a “source” of moral 
authority, as the only non-contingent, objective source of such 
authority is secular rationality which holds that no value other than 
freedom understood as autonomy (the right of each person to decide 
for themselves questions of moral value) is true. 
Second, religion as a category now became understood not as 
an external aspect of reality but as an internal subjective “value” 
located in the “inner mind” or consciousness of the individual as 
subject.  Religion was thus a set of beliefs, true if at all in only a non-
naturalist conception of moral value.  Such belief was not a genuine 
insight into the character of reality but only the subjective attitude of 
the thinker who proposed and adhered to it. 
And third, the understanding of religion as belief or conscience 
became secondary to the master universal value of autonomy such that 
any genuine religious beliefs must be autonomously chosen and 
affirmatively assented to by the individual as a set of propositions 
(subject to the overarching discipline of rationality itself).  This is 
what scholars such as Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood refer to as the 
modern conception of religion and religious subjectivity. 
III. THE JEWS’ FREE SCHOOL CASE 
These early histories and antinomies are consequential for our 
understanding of the formulation of religious liberty in provisions 
such as Article 9 of the ECHR which, as Nehal Bhuta notes, 
represents a “bricolage of rights-forms derived from heterogeneous 
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traditions and specific political projects.”24  The central argument in 
this Part is that this normative structure not only authorizes the state 
to intervene in what appear to be mere expressions of religious belief 
but in fact involve the State in making substantive judgments about 
religion, a domain toward which it claims to be neutral.  This has two 
paradoxical effects: first, by authorizing the state’s intervention into 
the forum internum which it declares to be autonomous and 
sacrosanct; and second, by privileging the values and commitments 
of the religious majority as the norm against which the religious 
practices of minorities are judged and sanctioned in the forum 
externum.25  
In order to see how these two paradoxes are generated, let us 
turn to consider the reasoning in the JFS case.  The Jews’ Free 
School (“JFS”) was founded in 1732 and is today one of the best, 
state-funded schools in London. JFS gives preference to Jews in its 
admissions decisions and recognizes the authority of the Office of the 
Chief Rabbi, as head of the United Synagogue, to determine who is 
Jewish for these purposes. This is permitted under English law but 
only on the basis that the determination is made on grounds of 
“religious” belief, membership or practice. Under the Race Relations 
Act 1976 (“RRA 1976,”) there is no exemption for discrimination on 
grounds of “race” which is defined to include “ethnic or national 
origins.”  
A 12-year old boy “M” applied for admission to the school. M’s 
mother, who was Italian Catholic by birth, had converted to Judaism 
under the supervision of a non-Orthodox (Masorti) rabbinate. M was 
living with his father at the time and they were both members of a 
Masorti synagogue. M was denied admission because he was not 
recognized as being Jewish according to Orthodox interpretation of 
halakhah according to which M would be considered Jewish only if 
his mother was Jewish (the matrilineal test) or if M underwent a 
conversion under the supervision of an Orthodox rabbi. Given that 
the Office of the Chief Rabbi did not recognize the conversion of M’s 
mother on the basis that it did not recognize the halakhic authority of 
the Masorti Rabbinic courts, and given that M himself did not wish to 
 
24. Nehal Bhuta, Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court 
of Human Rights, 113 STH. ATL. Q. 9, 10 (2014). 
25. For detailed elaboration of this argument in a different context, see Saba 
Mahmood and Peter Danchin, Immunity or Regulation? Antinomies of Religious 
Freedom, 113 SOUTH ATL. Q. 129 (2014). 
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undergo an Orthodox conversion, M was denied admission to JFS 
(his family’s practice of Judaism notwithstanding).  
M’s father sued JFS arguing that the school’s use of the 
matrilineal test in its admission policy violated the RRA 1976. A 
court at first instance upheld the school’s right to deny M admission. 
This was reversed on appeal and the case then came before the new 
U.K. Supreme Court. All nine judges wrote separate opinions 
reflecting striking differences in judicial reasoning and the 
complexity of the issues under consideration. Despite their 
differences, most expressed “sympathy” with the governors of the 
school and expressed anxiety about the Court’s decision stating that 
they thought “something has gone wrong.”26 
A majority of five judges (Lords Phillips, Mance, Kerr, Clarke 
and Lady Hale) held that the admissions policy of JFS constituted 
direct racial discrimination under the RRA 1976 on the grounds that 
the criteria used by JFS to select pupils treated applicants differently 
on account of their “ethnic origins.” Two judges (Lords Hope and 
Walker) concurred in this result but found instead that the admissions 
policy of JFS constituted permissible religious discrimination which 
had the unlawful effect of indirect racial or ethnic discrimination. The 
remaining two judges (Lords Rodger and Brown) dissented finding 
that JFS’s admissions policy was neither directly nor indirectly 
discriminatory under the RRA 1976. 
As a preliminary matter of history, there have been several ways 
to view neutrality and equality of treatment in religious matters. As 
Christopher McCrudden has observed, British legal policy towards 
majority and minority religious groups has moved through at least 
three phases: first, a phase in the early nineteenth century of political 
compromises accommodating conflicting interests; second, a mid‒
1960s “multicultural” phase which relied primarily on 
antidiscrimination law and accommodation of “new” ethnic groups, 
and third, a contemporary phase of “constitutional idealism” which 
focuses more on “principle” and the notion of fundamental rights as 
enacted in legislation such as the Human Rights Act 1998, which 
incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into British 
domestic law.27 
 
26. See Heather Miller Rubens, “Something has Gone Wrong”; The JFS Case 
and Defining Jewish Identity in the Courtroom, 29 MD. J. INT’L L. 366 (2014). 
27. Christopher McCrudden, Multiculturalism, Freedom of Religion, Equality, 
and the British Constitution: the JFS Case Considered, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. (I‒
CON) 200 (2011). 
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This shift towards quasi-constitutional liberal principles has 
supplanted both the legislative contingency towards religious 
traditions and groups of the pre-multicultural phase and the 
integrationism and antidiscrimination focus of the multicultural 
phase. Consequently, it has been left to the judiciary to determine 
how to apply rights to conflicts involving religion, culture and 
ethnicity. Practices previously regarded as “ethnic” and raising 
correlative duties of non-discrimination are today often viewed as 
“religious” to be adjudicated as a matter of individual rights.28 It was 
in context of this normative shift towards liberal rights discourse in 
British constitutionalism that the JFS case was both argued and 
ultimately decided by the U.K. Supreme Court. 
Given this background, what does it mean for a nation-state to 
be neutral towards Judaism as a “religion”? If neutrality previously 
meant affirmative engagement by the state with existing Jewish 
communities on matters pertaining to Jewish belief and practice, and 
later protection of such minority communities from acts of unlawful 
racial or ethnic discrimination, then today neutrality is understood as 
the protection of the right to freedom of religion and belief. In this 
sequence of moves, neutrality towards religion understood as an 
institution, way of life, or tradition has shifted almost imperceptibly 
to the question of the right to religious freedom which suggests that 
the state adjudicates between competing rights and not neutrality 
toward competing religions. This is a shift fraught with consequences 
as evident in the three domains of the conceptual structure, subject 
and authority of the right.  Let us consider each of these in turn.  
A. Forum Internum versus Forum Externum 
Recall again that the right to religious liberty is premised on the 
foundational distinction between the right to “freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion” in Article 9(1) and the right to “manifest 
one’s religion or beliefs” in Article 9(2).  The former, referred to as 
the forum internum, is held to be absolute while the latter, the forum 
 
28. Cf. Mandla v. Dowell Lee, [1983] 2 AC 548 (wearing of the turban held to 
be an ethnic practice) with R (Watkins‒Singh) v. The Governing Body of Aberdare 
Girls’ High School [2008] EWHC 1865 (Admin) (wearing of the Kara held to be 
both a religious and ethnic practice).  
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externum, is said to be subject to limitations where necessary to 
protect public order, morals, or the rights of others. 
The European Court of Human Rights has long struggled with 
the issue of how to define the content and scope of Article 9(1) and 
its religious liberty jurisprudence provides no clear guidance on the 
proper object of the protected sphere of the forum internum.  What is 
of interest here is how the different conceptions advanced in JFS by 
the majority, concurring and dissenting judgments respectively 
closely track the three approaches that have been adopted by the 
European Court of Human Rights of (1) autonomy, (2) 
conscience/belief, and (3) collective/institutional autonomy.   
While JFS is framed and adjudicated as a race discrimination 
case involving unfair treatment by a school admissions board toward 
one of its applicants, the majority opinion begins neither by setting 
out the relevant criteria of antidiscrimination law nor explaining the 
relations and duties of justice owed by one party to the other. Rather, 
it begins by citing the seventh chapter of Deuteronomy, the fifth book 
of the Hebrew Bible and the Jewish Torah, locating the source of the 
matrilineal test in the “clear commandment against intermarriage” in 
the third and fourth verses which Lord Phillips reads to yield the self-
evident conclusion that it is a “fundamental tenet of the Jewish 
religion … that the child of a Jewish mother is automatically and 
inalienably Jewish.”29 
A genuine ambiguity is thus presented at the outset regarding 
who or what exactly is on trial before the Court: is it JFS, for its 
treatment of M; or the ancient Israelite religion and its offspring, 
Judaism? This in turn generates deeper and deeply opposing 
anxieties. If the Court is to permit discrimination on the basis of race, 
ethnicity or descent solely because authorized by a religious tradition 
or justified on religious grounds, does this not pose a threat to the 
very foundations and conditions of our contemporary secularity and 
freedom? Conversely, if the Court is to prohibit such a long-standing 
practice internal to a religious tradition which entangles religious and 
descent-based criteria, does this not threaten the very idea of religious 
freedom which has long been understood to encompass the right of 
religious persons, groups and institutions to determine their own rules 
of belief, identity and membership free of state interference and 
regulation?  
 
29. JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, ¶ 2. 
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As the reasoning in the majority, concurring and dissenting 
judgments unfolds, we see the antinomies and contradictions 
characteristic of religious freedom discourse as the fundamental 
liberal premises of state neutrality towards religion and universality 
of the right to religious liberty are continually entangled with and 
defined in terms of their opposites. This is seen also in the arguments 
adduced by the parties. Having first claimed to be bound by 
immutable religious law, JFS and the OCR paradoxically invoke the 
right as a matter of religious freedom to decide for themselves 
matters of religious doctrine and orthodoxy. Conversely, having 
claimed the right to be free from racial and ethnic discrimination and 
to practice their religion freely, M and his parents paradoxically rely 
on a distinctly modern conception of religion understood in terms of 
individual belief regarded as freely chosen to apply to an Orthodox 
Jewish school. 
But it is the divergences in reasoning in and across the nine 
separate judgments that best illustrate the modern politics of religious 
freedom. In contrast to his opening reference to Deuteronomy, Lord 
Phillips thereafter steadfastly claims no interest in any religious 
rationale for JFS’s actions: the Court will rule on the facts alone, not 
on the basis of any “religious” motivation or reason. The implicit 
assumption is that the forum internum protects only the right to 
choose one’s beliefs, not the immunity of the beliefs themselves. 
For Lord Phillips, religious criteria are thus subjective, non-
natural values or beliefs to which a person may choose to assent.30  
Religion is a matter of choice while race and ethnicity are immutable, 
unchosen characteristics. Whether the matrilineal test is assented to 
as a matter of religious motive or belief is thus irrelevant to the 
objective fact that M and his mother’s ethnic origins were the factual 
ground that determined the admissions decision made by JFS. 
This reasoning reverses the normative understanding of the 
relationship between immutability and autonomy advanced by JFS 
and OCR in their argument before the Court. The OCR 
acknowledged that “M was ‘ethnically’ Jewish, in the sense that he 
self-identified as Jewish, he was significantly involved with the 
Jewish community in various ways, and he was accepted as Jewish 
 
30.  Lord Phillips further states that “[m]embership of a religion or faith 
indicates some degree of conscious affiliation with the religion or faith on the part 
of the member.” JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, ¶ 44 (Lord Phillips) (emphasis added).  
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by at least parts of the community.”31 Ethnicity for the OCR was thus 
not biological but sociological, involving deep historical practices of 
social choice and collective autonomy. On the other hand, the OCR 
did not acknowledge that M was “religiously” Jewish because this 
was not a matter of individual or social choice but rather was to be 
determined by an Orthodox interpretation of halakhah which, as 
revealed religious law, was in some vital sense immutable and 
unchosen. The telescopic reduction by the majority of an entire 
discursive tradition and its centuries-old traditions of reasoning and 
interpretation into a mere subjective “motive” (then held to be 
entirely irrelevant) in contradistinction to a discriminatory “fact” or 
“ground” calls for serious reflection. 
The critical point, however, is that in arriving at this judgment, 
the majority draws a strong distinction between racial and religious 
grounds for exclusion, implicitly thus embracing a specific 
conception of religion as a non-racial and non-ethnic category which 
itself is authorized by a prior understanding of the essential nature of 
religion in terms of interiorized belief.   
The distinctive bifurcation of the modern right to religious 
liberty between a forum internum of sovereign individual belief and a 
forum externum of manifestation of that belief open to limitation and 
regulation is in this way mapped onto the logic of antidiscrimination 
law: to discriminate for any reason (religious or not) on the ground of 
an immutable characteristic such as race, ethnicity or descent is 
axiomatically unjust because it irrationally denies the personal 
autonomy and valuable choices of others. In this moral economy, 
religion properly understood is reduced to a state of mind – belief in a 
set of creedal propositions to which a legal subject voluntarily assents 
– which is “individual and otherworldly” rather than constituting any 
form of activity in the world.  
Judaism does not fit into these categories and contests this 
conception of immutable characteristics and valuable choices. As 
noted above, for JFS and the OCR, the relevant immutable 
characteristic is religious as constituted by Jewish religious law 
(halakhah) while it is ethnicity which is a matter of social choice. 
Indeed, it was central to OCR’s submissions before the Court that one 
 
31. McCrudden, supra note 27, at 13. On the reasoning of the House of Lords 
in Mandla v. Dowell‒Lee, if M was refused admission to a non‒faith based state 
school because he was Jewish, this would be racial discrimination because “he was 
being discriminated against on the grounds of his Jewish ethnicity.” Id. 
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could be Jewish according to religious law while explicitly rejecting 
any conscious affiliation with the Jewish religion or faith.  
The veracity and rationality of these positions are reflected in the 
reasoning of the concurring and dissenting judgments taken together. 
These judgments reject the majority’s interpretation of the distinction 
between racial and religious grounds finding not only that the 
religious motivations and reasons for the exclusionary actions of JFS 
are relevant to the determination of this question but that the 
exclusion of M was made on religious grounds as required by 
Orthodox religious Jewish law.  
Unlike Lord Phillips, Lord Hope argues that both motive and 
reasons for action “may be highly relevant to the determination of the 
crucial question: was this discrimination on racial grounds.”32  For 
Lord Hope, there is a distinction between the reasoning that follows 
from an obligation to comply with Orthodox religious law on the one 
hand and from a personal decision or “motive” to apply that law on 
the other.33  This yields the first major divergence in reasoning in the 
case. In contrast to the majority’s external, volitional and subjective 
stance towards Judaism and the obligation to comply with halakhah, 
the concurring judgments adopt an internal, cognitive and objective 
point of viewing in adjudicating the first level question of the 
distinction between racial and religious grounds. This opens the 
conceptual space for a different form of contestation as the exclusion 
of M is now adjudicated at the secondary level of indirect racial 
discrimination permitting JFS and the OCR to seek to justify the 
reasonableness of their actions towards M in the forum externum.  
This, in turn, yields the second major divergence in reasoning in 
the case. In contrast to the cognitivist conception of religion adopted 
by the concurrence (albeit with its recognition of the objectivity of 
reasons and obligations deriving from a different source), the 
 
32. ¶ 195. However, “once that conclusion has been reached, the fact that there 
may have been a benign reason for the discrimination is beside the point.” Id. 
33. A similar point is made by Lord Rodger in dissent:  
[M’s] mother could have been as Italian in origins as Sophia Loren 
and as Roman Catholic as the Pope for all that the governors cared: the 
only thing that mattered was that she had not converted to Judaism under 
Orthodox auspices. It was her resulting non‒Jewish religious status in the 
Chief Rabbi’s eyes, not the fact that her ethnic origins were Italian and 
Roman Catholic, which meant that M was not considered for admission.  
Id. ¶ 227 (Lord Rodger, dissenting).  
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dissenting judgments respond to and are more sensitive to a 
conception of Judaism as a living discursive tradition which 
encompasses a way of life with its own established and internally 
contested sources, justifications and hermeneutics and thus its own 
conceptions of religious identity, authority, membership and practice. 
It is this recognition that underlies the dissent’s reliance on more 
classical liberal ideas of negative liberty and judicial abstention 
which at the same time fail to take seriously or engage with the 
individual harm suffered by M as a result of the exclusionary actions 
of JFS and the OCR. 
For the dissenting judges it is implicit that JFS and the OCR as 
collective subjects have the right to profess and maintain a discursive 
religious tradition free of sovereign interference, even if this fails to 
address harms caused to members internal to the tradition itself.  
Only the concurring judgments of Lord Hope and Lord Walker 
squarely address this issue seeking to balance the conflicting claims 
of right of both JFS and M using concepts common to both 
antidiscrimination and human rights law of legitimate aim and 
proportionate means. Implicit in this analysis is an assessment of the 
harms imposed by JFS’s admissions policy on the valuable life 
choices and autonomy of M and his parents. Importantly, this is held 
to include their right to choose among Orthodox, Masorti, Reform 
and Liberal branches of Judaism which the concurrence implicitly 
weighs more heavily than the (collective) right of JFS to devise its 
own admissions policy and follow the advice of the OCR in basing 
criteria for membership on Orthodox Jewish religious law. 
In doing so, the reasoning in the concurring judgments implicitly 
makes an assessment of the reasonableness not of the matrilineal test 
but of the application by JFS towards M of Orthodox conversion 
criteria which is found to be insufficiently inclusive and pluralistic.  
In this sequence of maneuvers, the question of indirect racial 
discrimination based on immutable characteristics is subtly 
transformed into a reason-based jurisprudence premised on liberal 
criteria and fundamental values of individual freedom and autonomy.  
When this reasoning is considered alongside that of the majority, 
we see how Judaism is in fact indicted twice: first categorically by 
the majority in the forum internum for irrationally prescribing an 
immutable characteristic as part of the matrilineal descent test, and 
second by the concurrence in the forum externum for unreasonably 
denying the valuable choices of M and his parents regarding religion, 
a judgment which also implicitly scrutinizes and is suspicious of 
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beliefs and doctrines internal to the forum internum of the Jewish 
religion.34 
In response to the Court’s ruling that Orthodox Judaism’s 
membership and conversion criteria were unlawful for use in its 
admissions policy, JFS amended the policy to accept students on the 
basis of a “Certificate of Religious Practice” which gauges 
synagogue attendance, formal Jewish education and community 
participation.  This change in policy has removed the ability to accept 
children on the basis of the OCR’s definition of Jewish membership 
criteria and substituted it with a state-supervised policy of religious 
practice which is non-discriminatory, cross-denominational and free 
of reference to ethnic or decent-based criteria. The school remains a 
faith-based school but if it employs Orthodox halakhah as its grounds 
for admission, it transgresses the boundaries of state law.  
In this respect, the JFS case powerfully illustrates the distinctive 
modalities of the exercise of modern secular power. In defining the 
meaning, scope, and dialectical relationship between the public 
sphere and individual rights, the Court regulates and delimits what 
constitutes religion and a proper religious subjectivity as a matter of 
English law. This raises considerable anxieties amongst the judges 
themselves as the extent of intrusion of state law into the forum 
internum of the Jewish religion becomes visible whether 
axiomatically as a matter of direct discrimination or pursuant to the 
balancing of rights and interpretation of proportionality as a matter of 
indirect discrimination. 
In this complex set of moves, we see how the concept of 
neutrality towards Judaism is defined in terms of the right to religious 
liberty which, in turn, is defined in terms of competing conceptions 
of neutrality as the majority, concurring and dissenting judgments 
 
34. The separation between private inner belief and public outer act or 
expression is in fact “reunited through a suspicion of motives of material interest or 
worldly power. In the context of the freedom of religious belief, it becomes 
imperative to determine whether acts or expressions of belief are genuinely 
religiously motivated. This presumes the power to pronounce upon, and if 
necessary probe into, the character of one’s private convictions.” Hussein Ali 
Agrama, Religious Freedom and the Bind of Suspicion in Contemporary Secularity, 
in POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Elizabeth 
Shakman Hurd, Saba Mahmood and Peter Danchin eds., 2015). There is a sense in 
the concurring judgments that JFS and OCR are exercising their institutional 
authority on the issue of conversion in a way that is not entirely, or genuinely, or 
necessarily, religiously motivated. 
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each grapple with the implications of state authority vis-a-vis a 
competing normative system. The right to religious liberty is in this 
sense best viewed as a sophisticated technology of modern secular 
power which operates to discipline actually-existing religious 
traditions so they conform to those secular spaces and sensibilities 
religion properly should inhabit and express. 
In each of the three sets of judgments, no matter how the content 
and scope of the forum internum is demarcated the Court must make 
substantive judgments on what constitutes or falls within the 
protected category. The paradoxical result is that the courts must 
make determinations that are inescapably entangled with and 
premised on religious criteria and precepts in order to define a sphere 
“free” from state authority—a private space of exception—which 
ostensibly limits legislative and other forms of governmental 
authority. This ever shifting and contested process of construction 
and demarcation of the forum internum is an integral part of the 
public order of the state itself. 
As Agrama has observed, the ability to control these distinctions 
involves the fashioning of religion as an “object of continual 
management and intervention” and this constitutes a mode of 
discipline not always articulated in the practice of liberal 
governance.35 The reasoning in JFS, however, allows us to see how 
such modes of discipline function using the technology of modern 
rights discourse. What becomes clear is that both the subject of the 
right and the scope of freedom it encompasses are indeterminate 
categories. Further, the reasoning in the majority, concurring and 
dissenting judgments alike inescapably entangles conceptions of the 
religious and the secular as part of the state’s power and authority “to 
decide what shall count as essentially religious and what scope it can 
have in social life.”36 
This involves two critical determinations. First is the need to 
identify what about doctrine is “essentially a religious matter”. The 
Court’s five to four split on whether reliance by JFS and the OCR on 
the matrilineal test is a racial or religious ground of decision 
illustrates this first dilemma. Second is the need to distinguish 
between “the ‘civil’ and ‘religious’ dimensions of an act, and on that 
 
35. Hussein Ali Agrama, Secularism, Sovereignty, Indeterminacy: Is Egypt a 
Secular or Religious State? 52 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 495, 499 (2010).  
36. Id. 503. For this reason, “secularism’s power may lie more in the 
underlying question it continually provokes and obliges us to answer, than in the 
normativity of the categories it proposes.” Id. 500. 
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basis decide whether the act is enforceable, punishable, or otherwise 
deserving of protection or exemption under the law.”  The divergence 
between the concurring and dissenting judges on whether the 
exclusion of M constituted indirect racial discrimination and the 
ensuing lines of argument concerning the legitimacy of JFS’s aim and 
the proportionality of its means illustrate this second dilemma.  
In both cases, the Court must make an assessment of the 
religious beliefs at issue. This necessarily generates a “modality of 
suspicion” as the Court considers whether acts or expressions of 
belief are “genuinely religiously motivated” and the nature of the 
“belief” itself.37 What is critical to this liberal algebra is that religion 
be understood essentially as a type of subjective belief as opposed to 
any type of objective knowledge,38 and that it not be allowed to 
express “material interests or drives towards worldly power” which 
are seen as potentially dangerous or threatening, especially to those 
values foundational to the public order of the state.  
It is precisely the external, heteronomous, non-faith based 
imperative of matrilineal descent in the Jewish religion that violates 
these secular imperatives. On the one hand, an unchosen imperative 
is deeply irrational for contradicting the foundational value of 
individual autonomy and, on the other, potentially threatening for 






37. Agrama, supra note 34. A similar phenomenon can be traced in U.S. 
religious freedom jurisprudence where courts routinely determine whether 
“religious acts or expressions are sincerely held to be essential to one’s religion”, 
and whether “these acts and expressions are authorized and mandated by orthodox 
religious texts.” Id (citing WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2005)).  
38. The “circumscribed sphere of religion already articulates the principle that 
it ought to be separated from material power.” It is this understanding of religion 
and religious subjectivity that underlies the idea of state neutrality between 
religious and non‒religious but deeply held beliefs. If this were not the case, “it 
would be difficult to argue that the state should remain neutral between belief and 
what it sees as knowledge, especially in matters concerning public order and the 
governance of populations, when that knowledge is considered crucial to such 
governance.” Agrama, supra note 34.  
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B. Individual versus Group or Associational Rights 
The second dilemma for the Court in JFS, as in all religious 
freedom cases, is the proper subject of the right. While the majority 
and concurrence differ on the nature of the forum internum, they both 
agree that the essence of religion is to be found in a cognitive or 
rationalistic framework internal to the consciousness of the 
individual, whether autonomously to choose one’s beliefs (for the 
majority) or to have and maintain a certain category of belief (for the 
concurrence). This conceivably includes the fiction of a corporate 
entity such as JFS viewed as a legal subject acting as an individual 
decision-maker. For the dissenting judges, however, the proper 
subject of the right appears to encompass Judaism and Jewish 
religious practices more broadly construed.39  
Over the last few decades, a rich albeit poorly theorized body of 
jurisprudence has been developed under Article 9 of the ECHR in 
which claims to collective religious autonomy have been adjudicated. 
The European Court has held in a series of cases that it has limited 
jurisdiction to review the processes, reasoning or substantive 
decisions made by religious bodies within an area covered by 
religious autonomy.40 In similar terms, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recently recognized a “ministerial exception” to generally applicable 
employment discrimination laws in the case of EEOC v. Hosanna-
Tabor.  
The premise of such jurisdictional approaches to issues of 
religious autonomy is the notion that it is not for secular courts to 
make determinations on matters “strictly ecclesiastical” or involving 
religious teachings or orthodoxy. This proposition, however, leaves 
open a number of puzzles and dilemmas for the courts. The first 
relates to how the relevant autonomous sphere is to be drawn. If the 
RRA 1976 was intended to apply to religious schools and domains 
 
39. While neither Lord Brown nor Lord Rodger squarely address the question, 
their judgments appear to follow Asad’s conception of religion as a “lived” or 
“discursive” tradition which encompasses a practical mode of living and 
“techniques for teaching body and mind to cultivate specific virtues that have been 
authorized, passed on, and reformulated down the generations.” Talal Asad, Re‒
reading a Modern Classic: W. C. Smith’s ‘The Meaning and End of Religion,’ in 
RELIGION AND THE MEDIA 216 (Hent de Vries & Samuel Weber eds., 2001). The 
danger of adopting a “pietistic conception of religion as faith that is essentially 
individual and otherworldly” is to situate religion ineluctably within a secular 
image of the world. Id. 220.  
40. Obst v. Germany, no. 425/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 23, 2010); Lombardi‒
Valluari v. Italy, no. 39128/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 20, 2009); Scüth v. Germany, no. 
1620/03 (Eur Ct. H.R. Sept. 23 2010). 
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such as employment, why should it not apply to the internal activities 
of religious organizations in the case of acts of racial or ethnic 
discrimination?  
Conversely, if the right to religious freedom is interpreted to 
provide a form of collective immunity to religious organizations from 
legislative intervention in their internal affairs, on what basis does the 
RRA 1976 seek to regulate a religious school such as JFS which has 
the express purpose of effectuating the obligation imposed by Jewish 
religious law to educate those students regarded by the OCR as 
Jewish? Some argument is needed to justify this particular 
demarcation of spheres, an argument which itself must be neutral 
towards religion and respect the right to religious liberty.  
A second dilemma concerns how the state and state law are to 
relate to and recognize actually-existing systems of religious law. 
There are a tremendous variety of constitutional arrangements in the 
world today prescribing different forms of relation between the State 
and religion(s)41 and this includes a variety of forms of recognition of 
and formal relation to both majority and minority religions.  In South 
Africa, for example, section 15(3)(a)(ii) of the post-apartheid 1996 
Constitution expressly contemplates legislation recognizing “systems 
of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by 
persons professing a particular religion.” Various contingent forms of 
legal relation between the State and South Africa’s different religious 
communities, including groups living under customary law and 
religious minorities with their own family and personal status laws, 
have thus been developed through law reform efforts in the country 
over the last two decades.42 
We have seen how British legal policy towards majority and 
minority religious groups has moved through at least two early 
phases of legislative accommodation and multicultural recognition. 
But what is striking in JFS is how the courts today are employing 
constitutional liberal principles and alternatively classical ideas of 
negative liberty and judicial abstention evident in the dissenting 
judgments to adjudicate these forms of legal relation.  
 
41. Peter G. Danchin, Of Prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and 
the Conflict of Rights in International Law 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 249, 297–307 
(2008). 
42. Peter Danchin, The Politics of Religious Establishment: Recognition of 
Muslim Marriages in South Africa, in VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT 
165 (Lori G. Beaman & Winnifred Fallers Sullivan eds., 2013).  
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C. Conflicts of Rights 
The final and arguably most intractable dilemma in religious 
liberty discourse arises when two or more claims of right come into 
conflict with each other. The issue here is not the conflict per se 
between M’s right to be free from racial discrimination and JFS’s 
right to discriminate in its admissions policy on the basis of religion 
and belief. We saw how the majority decided this issue by defining 
the forum internum of the right to religious liberty narrowly as 
individual belief and interpreting the RRA 1976 as a valid limitation 
on the right to manifest religion in the forum externum in order to 
protect the rights of others.  
Rather, it is the disagreement between the concurring and 
dissenting judgments on the question of indirect racial discrimination 
that exposes a genuine conflict of rights internal to the right to 
religious liberty itself. The need to justify issues of legitimate aim 
and proportionate means of achieving that aim opened the 
deliberative space for claims to religious liberty to be advanced, 
albeit indirectly, by both M and JFS as reasons either to permit or 
prohibit the adverse impact of the school’s admissions policy on M 
and E (and other children not of Jewish ethnic origin in the maternal 
line).  
What is striking is the disagreement between the concurring and 
dissenting judgments in interpreting the concept of proportionality as 
to whether to privilege either the individual autonomy of M and E in 
matters of religion (i.e. the right to choose conversion under the 
authority of a non-Orthodox (Masorti) rabbinate) or the collective 
autonomy of JFS and the OCR to determine their own rules of 
religious membership.  
For the concurrence, JFS was found to have failed to consider 
whether admitting children recognized as Jewish by any of the 
branches of Judaism would undermine the religious ethos of the 
school. Having found at the first stage of analysis that the OCR was 
bound by and had the right to apply Orthodox Jewish religious law, 
the implicit suggestion at the second stage of analysis is that 
Orthodox rules on conversion are insufficiently pluralistic and 
inclusive and that JFS should interpret and apply these rules more 
sensitively to the values of individual freedom and choice.  
This argument does not address issues of racial or ethnic 
discrimination (recall that JFS accepted that M was “ethnically 
Jewish”) but rather substitutes the concurring judges’ conception of 
what constitutes religion and a proper religious subjectivity for that of 
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JFS and the OCR. This in fact reverses the logic of their claims, 
which were premised on the notion that it is halakhah is immutable, 
while ethnicity is a social choice. It is precisely this danger of non-
neutrality and interference in matters of religious doctrine and 
practice which drives the dissenting judgments towards judicial 
abstention and deference to the normative authority of JFS and the 
OCR which, in effect, privileges the right of JFS to collective 
freedom over the individual autonomy-based claims of M and E.  
As a matter of justice, neither position seems entirely 
satisfactory. Regardless of the merits of the competing positions, the 
interesting question from the perspective of any theory of religious 
freedom is why such debates within religious communities create 
different normative claims to those between religious communities 
and the state. The idea of value pluralism allows us to see that there is 
in fact more than one substantive rights claim at issue. Because the 
right to freedom of religion is a complicated bundle of entitlements, 
each made up of a diversity of claims, it protects a range of human 
interests that are often at odds.43 If this is correct, the critical question 
is why a majority of the U.K. Supreme Court so easily and at times 
without argument privileges one of the substantive rights claims at 
issue over the other. Further, if both claims are to be given their due, 
how should courts resolve such conflicts? 
However approached, it is clear that the historical relationships 
between groups within particular societies and their complex 
interrelationship within the legal framework of the state are pivotal to 
any understanding of how and why conflicts raise concerns for the 
right to religious freedom. Such conflicts give rise to both moral and 
ethical questions that bear a complex relationship to different types of 
relations between individuals and groups. 
The general point is that the conflicts which arose in JFS 
involving competing claims of religious freedom cannot 
meaningfully be addressed or properly understood without taking into 
account these collective dimensions of the question and the broader 
historical and inter-group context in which these forces and actors are 
operating. Paradoxically, this requires judges to turn to substantive 
(historical, cultural, religious) values and normative positions that 
transcend or lie beyond the competing rights claims themselves. This, 
 
43. Peter Danchin, Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of Religious 
Freedom in International Law, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2008).  
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of course, results in a constantly contested and thus oscillating series 
of antinomies in contradiction to the opening premises of neutrality 
towards religion and universality of the right.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has argued that the dialectical architecture of the 
right to religious liberty is a far more ambiguous instrument than 
conventionally assumed that in practice often legitimates rather than 
alleviates discriminatory practices of the state against religious 
communities.  This paradox haunts the jurisprudence of all 
contemporary legal systems which face irreconcilable conflicts in 
maintaining that religious belief is immune from state intervention on 
the one hand, while sanctioning its outward expression on the other.   
What is striking in a wide variety of contexts is how courts 
have tended to privilege the values and sensibilities of the majority 
religion (on the basis of the universality thesis) and discriminate 
against minority religions through recourse to the secular concept of 
public order (on the basis of the neutrality thesis).  As argued in Parts 
II and III, these two features are not a result of the misapplication of 
the right to religious liberty or the particular religious personality of 
certain states; they are instead a product of the contradictions and 
antinomies internal to the conceptual architecture of the right itself 
and emanate from the fraught and contested distinction between the 
forum internum and forum externum.  It is for this reason that we see 
such striking similarities in the conundrums entailed in regulating 
religious minorities across the Western and non-Western divide.   
What is most deeply at issue in such cases is not primarily the 
belief-action distinction as between the forum internum and 
externum, but the distinction between individual belief as an inner 
dimension of human consciousness and religion as a discursive 
tradition and collective identity of distinct communities.  This is a 
question that goes beyond public order limitations imposed on 
religious rites and rituals and entails instead how the very category 
demarcated as “religious” in the forum internum is defined in the first 
place.  Such a definition in cases such as JFS can be seen implicitly 
to challenge the equation of the forum internum with the “neutral” 
normativity of belief and the “universal” authority of the individual 
as subject alone. 
